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I. INTRODUCTION
“Tonight, somewhere in America, a young person, let’s say a
young man, will struggle to fall to sleep, wrestling alone with a
secret he’s held as long as he can remember. Soon, perhaps, he

* Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law. A.B., B.S.,
Stanford University; J.D., M.A., Ph.D. (History), University of California, Berkeley;
LL.M., University College London. Many people in many settings have contributed to
the development of this Article. I would like to thank the audience at the Lavender Law
Conference, and Elizabeth Glazer and Bill Araiza in particular; the 2010 LatCrit
workshop audience; the participants in the Oregon faculty “flash mob”; Ann Tweedy for
listening to this Article one too many times; and finally, the 2010 People of Color
Conference and Marc Poirier for all of his wonderful suggestions. I welcome comments
at smacias@siu.edu or macias@alumni.stanford.edu.

791

will decide it’s time to let that secret out. What happens next
depends on him, his family, as well as his friends and his teachers
and his community. But it also depends on us—on the kind of
society we engender, the kind of future we build.”
—President Barack Obama1
“Severe harassment . . . blends insensibly into bullying,
intimidation, and provocation, which can cause serious disruption
of the decorum and peaceable atmosphere of an institution
dedicated to the education of youth.”
—Judge Richard A. Posner2
“A bullied gay teenager who ends his life is saying that he can’t
picture a future with enough joy in it to compensate for the pain
he’s in now.”
—Dan Savage, It Gets Better Founder3
Although acknowledging “setbacks and bumps along the road,” in
October 2009, President Obama thought that “the future is bright for that
young person” he described above, the one hypothetically struggling to
come to terms with his homosexuality.4 Yet one year later, in the fall of
2010, the onslaught of media coverage about gay teenage suicides caused
gay-rights advocate and columnist Dan Savage to begin the It Gets Better
Project.5 Savage’s goal was to speak directly to gay adolescents via
YouTube, letting them know that others had come before them, faced
similar difficulties in school, and found that life got better after they toughed
it out.6 Even President Obama contributed to the project with a message of
his own, perhaps recognizing that the “setbacks and bumps along the road”
were more severe than he had suggested one year earlier.7 Unfortunately,

1. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Human Rights
Campaign Dinner (Oct. 11, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-human-rights-campaign-dinner.
2. Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 877 (7th Cir. 2011).
3. Dan Savage, Introduction to IT GETS BETTER: COMING OUT, OVERCOMING
BULLYING, AND CREATING A LIFE WORTH LIVING 1, 3 (Dan Savage & Terry Miller eds.,
2011).
4. Obama, supra note 1.
5. Savage, supra note 3, at 1–4; About Us, IT GETS BETTER PROJECT, http://www.it
getsbetter.org/pages/about-it-gets-better-project/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
6. Savage, supra note 3, at 4.
7. See Barack Obama, President Obama Shares His Message of Hope and
Support for LGBT Youth Who Are Struggling with Being Bullied, in IT GETS BETTER,
supra note 3, at 9, 9–10.
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the suicides continue, as does the harassment of adolescents, especially
young males, because of their sexual orientation.8
For a variety of reasons, public schools have not been adamant about
protecting gay students from harassment while in their care. Those schools
that have made attempts to curb bullying and harassment have found
themselves subjected to criticisms and lawsuits for First Amendment
violations. As the New York Times recently reported, “Angry parents and
religious critics . . . charge that liberals and gay rights groups are using the
antibullying banner to pursue a hidden ‘homosexual agenda,’ implicitly
endorsing, for example, same-sex marriage.”9 More recent instances of
how antigay students and parents are undermining antibullying efforts are
occurring through lawsuits claiming that bullying and harassing words
constitute First Amendment speech. Thus, during an antibullying week at a
northern Illinois high school, several students showed up wearing shirts that
read “Straight Pride” on the front and quoted Leviticus on the back to the
effect that homosexuals are “an abomination and shall surely be put to
DEATH.” 10 Because of a recent lawsuit won by an antigay student
involving a similar fact pattern, students like those wearing the “Straight

8. See, e.g., 16-Year-Old Arrested for Antigay Beating, ADVOCATE.COM (Mar. 7,
2011, 1:35 PM), http://www.advocate.com/News/Daily_News/2011/03/07/16_Year_
Old_Arrested_for_Antigay_Beating/ (discussing a high school student who severely beat
and attacked his openly gay classmate); Ben Deci, Bullied Elementary Student Arrested
After Wishing for Gun, FOX40 (Mar. 3, 2011, 6:11 PM), http://www.fox40.com/news/
headlines/ktxl-elementary-student-arrested-after-wishing-for-gun-in-yuba-city20110
303,0,3339845.story (reporting about an eleven-year-old boy named Brenton who was
arrested at elementary school for saying that he wished he had a gun because bullies
called him “‘Brentina,’ and ‘homo,’ and ‘fag’”); Kim Hone-McMahan, Rittman Boy May
Have Died Because of Bullying, OHIO.COM (Mar. 10, 2011, 7:28 PM), http://www.ohio.
com/news/rittman-boy-may-have-died-because-of-bullying-1.205703 (discussing thirteenyear-old boy who shot himself because of rumors that he might have been gay); Lance
Lundsten’s Death Ruled Suicide Due To Mixed Drug Ingestion, CARING FOR OUR
CHILDREN FOUND. (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.caringforourchildrenfoundation.org/
?p=3369 (reporting openly gay high school senior who committed suicide was “bullied
at school for his sexual orientation”).
9. Erik Eckholm, In Schools’ Efforts To End Bullying, Some See Agenda, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2010, at A16. For a gay perspective on Focus on the Family’s criticism
of antibullying efforts see Current, That’s Gay Salutes: Focus on the Family, YOUTUBE
(Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1t3cPaSIbWs.
10. ‘Straight Pride’ T-Shirts with Bible Quotation Cause Stir at St. Charles North
High School, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 12, 2010, 7:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2010/11/12/straight-pride-tshirts-wi_n_782816.html (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also James Fuller, ‘Straight Pride’ Shirts Become Free Speech Fight at St. Charles
North, DAILY HERALD (Nov. 11, 2010, 9:04 AM), http://www.dailyherald.com/article/
20101110/news/711119792/.
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Pride” shirts can feel relatively untouchable by school authorities.11 Indeed,
even the local spokesperson for the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) gave the antigay students implicit encouragement by labeling the
regulation of their harassment “extraordinarily difficult” because it
concerned “the important right of students to engage in free speech.”12
One of the main points of this Article is that preventing bullying carried out
through attacks on gay self-worth should be extraordinarily easy, not
extraordinarily difficult, because it is not the sort of political speech in
which public school students have any right to engage.
Part II examines the popular conception of the relationship between
childhood and sexuality by considering the political and legal fallout of the
same-sex marriage debate, especially the Proposition 8 debate in California.
Part III then sets out a pragmatic view of schooling, drawing upon the work
of philosophers Richard Rorty and Amy Gutmann. This Part examines the
social function of public schooling and explains its fundamental
incompatibility with a strong rights-based argument for student-harasser
autonomy. Part IV employs critical theory in an attempt to understand why
First Amendment defenses to gay harassment have such widespread appeal
in both popular and legal circles. Part V then examines the recent case law
with two primary objectives: (1) to expose the heteronormative
underpinnings of the legal treatment of children and (2) to expose the liberal
individualistic theory that underlies the student cases. Part of the
explanation involves an exploration of how the heteronormativity of the
case law undermines gay students’ existential status and how the dominant
liberal theory undermines the social purposes of public schooling. Finally,
the Article concludes with some suggestions for how the legal system can
make good use of various social science evidence on public schooling, thus
creating a link between real harm and real students.

11. Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 2011)
(upholding nominal damages and injunctive and declaratory relief against a public
school for attempting to ban a shirt that read “Be Happy, Not Gay”). As I explain below,
however, the problem is not with Judge Posner’s rationale in this case or its earlier
incarnation. See supra text accompanying notes 151–58; see also Nuxoll v. Indian
Prairie Sch. Dist. #204, 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (reversing the denial of a
preliminary injunction in the same case). Rather, the problem is the school’s complete
lack of resourcefulness in explaining how bullying, including insulting t-shirts, causes
actual harm to gay adolescents and therefore meets the legal criteria of causing
“substantial disruption” to the school environment. See Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 673–74.
12. Fuller, supra note 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).

794

[VOL. 49: 791, 2012]

Sexuality and Speech Rights
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

II. THE PERFECT STORM OF POLITICS, LAW, AND ADOLESCENT
SEXUALITY: THE EXAMPLE OF PROPOSITION 8
“Unless Proposition 8 passes, children will be taught about samesex marriage in public schools. . . . And not only that, it’s gonna
require that sex education classes include talking about, well, you
know, gay and lesbian relationships.”
—Proposition 8 Commercial13
“It’s inevitable. This door’s wide open now. It’s gonna happen,
whether you like it or not. This is the future, and it’s now. Courts
across this country. We’re waking up.”
—Gavin Newsom, Mayor of San Francisco14
That was then-San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom speaking at a
lunchtime rally at city hall on the day the California Supreme Court ruled
that same-sex couples were entitled to equal marriage rights.15 Spoken in a
stream-of-consciousness fashion, Newsom uttered the words that would
come to haunt him and the marriage equality movement. Months later,
proponents of a state constitutional amendment designed to overturn the
court’s decision were running ads featuring Newsom’s guttural
exclamation, “Whether you like it or not!”16 The television commercials

13. VoteYesonProp8, California’s Children, YOUTUBE (Oct. 24, 2008), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=dd7RzcPxA2E (using emphasis to denote that the commercial
voiceover says “relationships” in a clearly euphemistic way to imply “sex”).
14. JGarcia19, Same-Sex Marriage May 15 SFCity Att. Herrera & Mayor Newsom,
YOUTUBE (May 15, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d4Ke8gEc4Hs.
15. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008), superseded by
constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (West, Westlaw through June 2012
ballot propositions).
16. VoteYesonProp8, Yes on 8 TV Ad: Whether You Like It or Not, Y OU T UBE
(Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4kKn5LNhNto. In a previous
article, I celebrated Richard Rorty’s statement that “‘some hypothetical future reversal of
Bowers v. Hardwick’ would [say], ‘Like it or not, gays are grown-ups, too.’” Steven J.
Macias, Rorty, Pragmatism, and Gaylaw: A Eulogy, a Celebration, and a Triumph, 77
UMKC L. REV. 85, 107 (2008) (emphasis added) (quoting Richard Rorty, The Banality
of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1811, 1818 (1990)). I have
no particular affinity for the phrase “like it or not,” especially in the realm of public
debate. In fact, I think Newsom’s use of it was a major political blunder. I value Rorty’s
use of it, however, not as political speech, but as a means of explaining that decisions
like Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and the California In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384, are not motivated by any particular philosophical grounds or jurisprudential
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appeared designed to taunt the viewing audience, egged on by the
announcer who explained to potential voters, “We don’t have to accept
this.”17 Despite the appearance to the contrary, Newsom was actually not
mocking that element of the California public for not being as morally
advanced as his own Bay Area. Instead, Newsom was saying that because
the California Supreme Court is the most widely cited state supreme court
in the nation,18 other state courts would inevitably follow the reasoning of
In re Marriage Cases. Indeed, Newsom was somewhat vindicated by the
Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision just five months later19 and the Iowa
Supreme Court’s decision less than a year later20—decisions that were
clearly indebted to the California case. Instead of appreciating that educated
observation, California voters outside of the Bay Area interpreted
Newsom’s words as an undemocratic affront to their ultimate
decisionmaking authority.21 However, anti-same-sex marriage forces did
not rest upon a populist message alone. Newsom’s press conference
enthusiasm was coupled with ads designed to frighten parents into thinking

principles, but rather by profound realizations that, like it or not, human misery will be
decreased by their enforcement.
17. VoteYesonProp8, supra note 16. For additional advertisements in favor of
Proposition 8, see VoteYesonProp8, Uploaded Videos, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/
user/VoteYesonProp8 (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
18. See Jake Dear & Edward W. Jessen, “Followed Rates” and Leading State
Cases, 1940–2005, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 683, 710 (2007) (“[T]he California Supreme
Court has been the most followed state high court, and that trend continues.”); see also
Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State Supreme
Courts, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 178, 180 (1985) (identifying California’s highest court as
one of the most commonly cited state high courts); Jake Dear & Edward W. Jessen,
Measuring the Comparative Influence of State Supreme Courts: Comments on Our
“Followed Rates” Essay, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1665 (2008) (elaborating on the findings
from the previously cited study).
19. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 424 (Conn. 2008) (“We
therefore agree with the California Supreme Court and conclude that the defendants’
contention that same sex and opposite sex couples are not similarly situated clearly lacks
merit.”). The California decision is cited twenty-three times in the majority opinion. Id.
passim. Although one opinion does not yet prove that “th[e] door’s wide open now,” it is
encouraging. These are the most forceful examples of California’s influence: “Although the
opinion of the California Supreme Court . . . represents the minority view, we agree
fundamentally with the analysis and conclusion of that case that gay persons are entitled to
heightened judicial protection as a suspect class.” Id. at 472 (footnotes omitted). “[W]e are
not persuaded by the logic or analysis of the courts that have declined to grant suspect or
quasi-suspect status to gay persons. We are persuaded, rather, by the California Supreme
Court in In re Marriage Cases . . . .” Id. at 472–73.
20. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). Varnum cited the California case
at least seven times. Id. passim. The Connecticut case seemed to receive more mention
within Varnum than the California case.
21. For a map of the vote by county, see Proposition 8–Eliminates Right of SameSex Couples To Marry, C AL . SECRETARY S T ., http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/
2008_general/maps/returns/props/prop-8.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2012). Only one county
south of Monterey County voted against Prop. 8. Id.
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the California Supreme Court—or “four activist judges in San Francisco,”
as the majority was referred to in the state’s Voter Guide22—Gavin
Newsom, and the San Francisco Bay Area were on a collective mission to
indoctrinate schoolchildren into the homosexual lifestyle.23
During the 2008 election cycle, it seemed to many voters that Snow
White and Cinderella might finally decide to ditch their intended princes
in favor of tying the knot with each other. So frightened of that
very possibility were some voters that gay marriage was rescinded in
California largely because opponents asserted that its validation would
require the public schools to “teach gay marriage” as part of the curriculum
through children’s books such as King & King and Heather Has Two
Mommies.24 In an anti-same-sex marriage television advertisement, a
little girl of about eight years old comes running from school into her
house, where her apparently stay-at-home mother is awaiting her arrival,
gleefully yelling, “Mom, guess what I learned in school today?”25 The
doting mother responds, “What sweetie?” at which point the excited girl
exclaims, “I learned how a prince married a prince, and I can marry
a princess.” 26 A look of shock and disgust overtakes the mother’s

22. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4,
2008: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 56 (2008), available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/
2008/general/pdf-guide/vig-nov-2008-principal.pdf.
23. VoteYesonProp8, supra note 13.
24. See A Lesson About Prop. 8, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2008), http://articles.latimes
com/2008/oct/21/opinion/ed-prop8-21; see also LINDA DE HAAN & STERN NIJLAND, KING
& KING (2000); LESLÉA NEWMAN, HEATHER HAS TWO MOMMIES (10th anniversary ed.
2000). In a stunning turn of events, the chair of Maine’s “Yes on 1” campaign—Maine’s
Question 1 was the equivalent of California’s Proposition 8—admitted, “You know, we
say things like, ‘Teachers will be forced to (teach same-sex marriage)!’ Well, that’s not
a completely accurate statement and we all know it isn’t, you know?” Watch: Chair of
Maine’s “Yes on 1” Campaign, Which Banned Same-Sex Marriage, Expresses Regret in
New Doc, TOWLEROAD (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.towleroad.com/2011/04/question1.
html.
25. VoteYesonProp8, Yes on 8 TV Ad: It’s Already Happened, YOUTUBE (Oct. 7,
2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0PgjcgqFYP4.
26. Id. Melissa Murray has done a deconstructive reading of this commercial,
noting how the ad reinforces traditional notions of gender and family. Melissa Murray,
Marriage Rights and Parental Rights: Parents, the State, and Proposition 8, 5 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 357, 381–83 (2009). In invalidating Proposition 8 as having no noninvidious
motivation, Judge Vaughn Walker used evidence that this commercial promoted the
message that “if Prop 8 failed, the public schools are going to turn my daughter into a
lesbian” and “that unless Proposition 8 passes, children will be exposed to indoctrination on
gay lifestyles.” Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 989–90, 991 (N.D. Cal.
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052
(9th Cir. 2012).
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visage, when Professor Richard Peterson of Pepperdine Law School27
comes on screen to explain how this scenario is itself not a fairytale but
in fact the reality in Massachusetts, where same-sex marriage is legal.28
According to Professor Peterson, Massachusetts second graders are taught
that “boys can marry boys,” and “the courts ruled that parents have no
right to object.”29
Once her little princess gets to high school, the mother in the antisame-sex-marriage commercial will no doubt be even more surprised
and disappointed to learn that public-school teenagers have been forming
gay-straight alliances, even in conservative areas such as Poway, California,
Naperville, Illinois, and Ponce de Leon, Florida.30 To combat this
unwelcome force, antigay teens have attempted to respond by wearing
t-shirts with slogans written on them, such as “Homosexuality is
Shameful”31 and “Be Happy, Not Gay.”32 They have met with varying
success in the courts against school administrators’ attempts to prevent
their t-shirt displays. On the other hand, at least one antigay principal
attempted to prevent straight students from wearing “Gay Pride” t-shirts.33
Yet, what poses more of a conundrum to antigay students, parents,
teachers, and administrators—even more troubling to them than progay
storybooks and progay clubs—are actual progay gays. These are real-life
students who cannot be censored like books or clubs, or scared away by
t-shirts, however unfashionable. Their very presence in the public schools is
a constant reminder of what antigay political factions attempt to obliterate—
the existence of gay identity. Regardless of how well they isolate their
children, how intense their Bible study proves to be, or how many antigay
27. It initially seemed that Pepperdine was embarrassed by Peterson’s appearance
because the school made him alter the identification information on the commercial after
its first airing. See Jaimie Franklin, Proposition 8 Ad Angers Students, Pep Intervenes,
PEPP. U. GRAPHIC (Oct. 2, 2008), http://graphic.pepperdine.edu/news/2008/2008-10-02gay-marriage.htm (“[A]dministrators requested the reference to Pepperdine be removed
from the ad.”). However, then-Dean Ken Starr of the very same law school later successfully
argued the validity of Proposition 8 before the California Supreme Court. Pepperdine Graphic
Web Admin, Starr Defends Prop 8 Before Calf. Supreme Court, PEPP. U. GRAPHIC (Mar. 19,
2009), http://www.pepperdine-graphic.com/news/starr-defends-prop-8-before-calf-supremecourt/.
28. VoteYesonProp8, supra note 25.
29. Id. During the ad, Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008), which held
that parents objecting a public school’s use of books featuring same-sex couples as part
of a family failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, flashes on the
screen without explanation.
30. I classify these areas as “conservative” by the fact that Republican members of
Congress represent all three cities in the U.S. House of Representatives as of September 2012.
31. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2006),
vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
32. See Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. #204, 523 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 2008).
33. See Gillman v. Sch. Bd. for Holmes Cnty., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1362–63 (N.D.
Fla. 2008).
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pieces of legislation they get passed, the gays refuse to go away. As a
result, gay students not only face silence about their existence in the
curriculum and vitriolic t-shirts on campus, they also face threatened and
actual physical violence and emotional hardship, along with do-nothing or
complicit school staffs. Victimized students have had some success in the
legal arena, winning civil rights lawsuits in federal and state courts, but
usually not before severe beatings and suicide attempts.34 Thus, what is
needed is a legal argument for stronger preventative measures taken by the
public schools—measures that would cut the harassment off at the source—
rather than simply a legal solution once the damage is done.
For schools to have a strong argument that they need to protect an
identifiable group of students from targeted harassment, both educational
and legal actors must first agree that such a group exists and that the
offensive conduct strikes the students at the core of their beings.
Therefore, what follows is an examination of gayness—affirmative gay
identity—within the public school realm. Portrayals of gayness enter the
schoolhouse through the curriculum,35 through student-initiated groups
and activities,36 and through the very presence of gay-identified students.37
Bound up with these examples are legal questions of parents’ rights, free
speech, free exercise of religion, and equal protection from discriminatory
treatment. However, I propose to consider sexuality in the public schools
from a pragmatic perspective that begins with the acknowledgement of

34. See, e.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 456–58, 460–61 (7th Cir. 1996)
(allowing equal protection claim against school for failure to prevent students from
physically assaulting plaintiff); Donovan v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d
285, 293–94 (Ct. App. 2008) (allowing a state law claim against the school district for
peer sexual harassment by fellow students).
35. See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2008) (discussing a
challenge to storybooks that religious parents claimed promoted homosexuality);
Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., No. Civ.A. AW05-1194, 2005 WL 1075634, at *1 (D. Md. May 5, 2005) (discussing challenge to health
education curriculum as promoting the “homosexual lifestyle”).
36. See, e.g., Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550 (N.D.
Tex. 2004); Boyd Cnty. High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp.
2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2003); Franklin Cent. Gay/Straight Alliance v. Franklin Twp. Cmty.
Sch. Corp., No. IP01–1518 C–M/S, 2002 WL 32097530 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 30, 2002);
E. High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Utah 1999).
37. Whether identification is voluntary or not, and whether homosexual orientation
is real or misperceived, is of no moment.
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the existence of gay students—a proposition by no means obvious or
agreeable to all sides.38
III. A PRAGMATIC VIEW OF SCHOOLING
“When people on the political right talk about education, they
immediately start talking about truth. . . . When people on the
political left talk about education, they talk first about freedom.”
—Richard Rorty39
“Whereas liberals tend to worry that children will be given too little
freedom too late, conservatives tend to worry that they will be
given too much too early.”
—Amy Gutmann40
A pragmatic view of public schooling would realize “that the word
‘education’ covers two entirely distinct, and equally necessary, processes—
socialization and individuation.”41 Socialization is the process whereby
American youngsters come to understand and appreciate that they are
part of an already existing community, complete with rules, norms, and
acceptable modes of behavior, that is, social truths. Education for
socialization is the realm in which future citizens should learn how to
treat others with respect and dignity. Moreover, it is during this time
that children should be taught not to inflict needless pain—emotional or
physical—on other individuals. In order to fully absorb this rule and
make all of it that they can, children must also be taught to recognize
pain in others, especially if the cause of one’s pain is not universally
shared by others.42
38. For an interesting take on this same basic instinct, see Teemu Ruskola, Minor
Disregard: The Legal Construction of the Fantasy That Gay and Lesbian Youth Do Not
Exist, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 269 (1996). See also Bruce MacDougall, The Legally
Queer Child, 49 MCGILL L.J. 1057 (2004), which examines Canadian “judicial
involvement in erasing or diminishing the existence of gay, lesbian, and other queer
children.”
39. RICHARD RORTY, Education as Socialization and as Individualization, in
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 114, 114 (1999).
40. Amy Gutmann, What Is the Value of Free Speech for Students?, 29 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 519, 529 (1997).
41. RORTY, supra note 39, at 117.
42. This last point gets at the heart of the concept of empathy. Many people, but
especially young children, lack empathy for animals. This is why toddlers must be
taught, not without challenge, to not pull the cat’s tail or the dog’s ears—they fail to
understand that their actions can cause pain to a sentient being. The process of learning
to identify and to empathize with other sentient beings is the process of learning to
become a moral adult—one who refuses to inflict needless pain on another. Of course
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By contrast, education for individuation should “help students realize
that they can reshape themselves—that they can rework the self-image
foisted on them by their past, the self-image that makes them competent
citizens, into a new self-image, one that they themselves have helped to
create.”43 In other words, individuation is freedom from past socialization.
Ideally, humanistic university education would aid young adults in
criticizing those elements of our society that do not quite live up to the
patriotic ideals taught to them since in kindergarten. Students in the
process of individualistic critical thinking should come to question just
how well the teachings of their childhood churches, parents, or high school
government teachers match up with their own concepts of liberty or the
pursuit of happiness.
Taking this view of education as my ideal, I argue that the American
public school system is failing to make the most of its socialization
responsibilities by ignoring the existence of gay citizens and especially
gay students placed in its care. I do not argue that any complex, or even
simple, theories of sexuality should be taught to the very young. Nor do
I argue that the schools should engage in the exploration of the origins of
sexual attraction at any point in the curriculum. Those questions can
await the critical thinking encouraged in more advanced educational
settings. What I do think the public schools can and should do is
stop denying the social existence of gay individuals—including gay
students—and instead teach students to recognize the excessive pain
caused to their fellow gay students by relentless harassment.44
In order to ensure the emotional and physical happiness of gay students,
however, much more is required than mere attention to students’ mental
and bodily safety. Obviously, young students should be taught not to
cause embarrassment to their fellow classmates based upon some core
feature of their persons. This simple lesson is best taught not through
humans, unlike other animals, possess the unique capability of being able to experience
emotional, and not just physical, pain. Because the causes of emotional pain are more
varied than the causes of physical pain, the moral lessons are more difficult on this front.
But that difficulty does not mean that the actual pain experienced as a result of verbal
attacks on one’s identity is any less morally consequential.
43. RORTY, supra note 39, at 118.
44. The term social existence is deliberately used to indicate my basic agreement
that, legally and politically, we need worry only about social realities and not about “natural”
or biological ones, whatever those might be. In other words, to borrow a description from
Judith Butler, a person is “one who might be said to be a social practice, one whose ontology
is that of an ongoing and revisable social practice or set of social practices. . . . No practice,
no person.” Judith Butler, “Appearances Aside,” 88 CALIF. L. REV. 55, 58 (2000).
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negative action, such as official proscription followed by punishments
for the offender, but rather by fostering an intellectual and social
atmosphere that recognizes gay people as an equal category of fellow
American citizens. For the very young, this means presenting to them
same-sex relationships on par with cross-sex relationships while passing
no comparative moral judgment on either pairing but simply pointing out
to students their social reality.45 Once students begin to study the history
of social movements, the gay rights movement might be sequenced
behind the movements for racial equality and women’s rights. But
again, this might be done from a nonnormative perspective by explaining
that each movement had its supporters and detractors, each with their
own historically contingent set of concerns. Finally, as students begin to
gain more self-consciousness as social beings—say in high school or
perhaps slightly before then—they may demand more information, now
from a political perspective, about where they fit into society at large.
At this stage they may want to form clubs to express their social identity
and seek out other like-minded students. For gay students, this point in
their lives would be made much easier if they and their fellow straight
students had been made aware of the social and historical existence of
the social phenomenon of gayness since their earliest memories in
kindergarten.
To the extent this sounds heavy-handed or overly optimistic, I would
point readers to the public opinion polls that demonstrate that the younger
generations have a much less negative view about their fellow gay
citizens than older generations.46 The most intuitive explanation for this
divergence is that the young have grown up with somewhat normalized
depictions of gayness in popular culture. This onset of normalization in
the youth culture, in turn, leads more gay youth to declare their sexuality
early on in adolescence. When combined, these two occurrences make
the existence of gayness very concrete, and perhaps even unremarkable,
for a large segment of children because they see gayness not only on
television, in movies, and in music, but also in the classroom, in the
lunchroom, and at the mall. This qualitative—if not quantitative—
45. Of course, recognizing the social reality of some situation is necessarily
passing a moral judgment upon it. What I mean here is that both types of intimate
relationships might be presented as though they were morally inconsequential relative to
each other, thus eliminating the significance of the presently recognized difference
between such relationships.
46. See, e.g., Lydia Saad, Americans’ Acceptance of Gay Relations Crosses 50%
Threshold, GALLUP POL. (May 25, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/135764/
Americans-Acceptance-Gay-Relations-Crosses-Threshold.aspx. According to this poll,
62% of men under age 50 consider same-sex relationships to be moral, while only 44%
of men over age 50 hold that view. Id. The difference among women under and over
age 50 was almost as great: 59%–43%. Id.

802

[VOL. 49: 791, 2012]

Sexuality and Speech Rights
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

prevalence of gayness results in youths viewing fellow gay students as
merely fellow students. Moreover, unlike older generations who view
gayness as a social novelty or aberration rather than a social fact, the
young better appreciate the sadistic quality of discriminatory treatment
designed to socially annihilate gayness.47 It is this attitudinal change that
should be fostered in the public schools, mainly through the mechanism of
socialization. Too often, however, judges are dumbstruck when new
social issues, especially ones that involve sexuality, face them in the
courtroom. Instead of educating themselves in the social realities of the
times, they apply the only thing they know, outdated precedent and case
law from another era.48
Amy Gutmann offers a more substantive theory for why public schools
should commit themselves to teaching the value of tolerance, even over
the objection of intolerant parents and schoolchildren.49 “[T]he realm of
public schooling is a democratic government’s single most powerful and
legitimate means of teaching respect for reasonable political disagreement.”50
For Gutmann, it comes down to “a commitment to treating adults as free
and equal beings.”51 A characteristic of free and equal beings is that they
should be able to “offer one another morally defensible reasons for mutually
binding laws.”52 The civic responsibility of offering one’s fellow citizens
engaging justifications for one’s public policy choices requires “the ability

47. For example, a recent bill filed in the Tennessee General Assembly would
prohibit public elementary and middle schools from providing “any instruction or
material that discusses sexual orientation other than heterosexuality.” H.R. 229, 107th
Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Tenn. 2011); S. 49, 107th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Tenn.
2011). One can only assume that the supporters of the bill believe that if young children
do not hear about the existence of homosexuality then they themselves will not become
homosexual. By contrast, the premise of this Article is that homosexuality is a social
phenomenon that cannot be legislated away.
48. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 346 (1992) (“[W]hat . . . judges mainly
know is their own prejudices plus what is contained in judicial opinions.”).
49. See AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION, at xii (rev. ed. 1999); Amy
Gutmann, Civic Minimalism, Cosmopolitanism, and Patriotism: Where Does Democratic
Education Stand in Relation to Each?, in 43 NOMOS: MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION
23 (Stephen Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., 2002) [hereinafter Gutmann, Civic Minimalism];
Amy Gutmann, Civic Education and Social Diversity, 105 ETHICS 557 (1995) [hereinafter
Gutmann, Civic Education]; Gutmann, supra note 40. On the relevance of Gutmann’s
work to the rights of public school teachers, see Merle H. Weiner, Dirty Words in the
Classroom: Teaching the Limits of the First Amendment, 66 TENN. L. REV 597, 658–61
(1999).
50. Gutmann, Civic Education, supra note 49, at 579.
51. Gutmann, Civic Minimalism, supra note 49, at 25.
52. GUTMANN, supra note 49, at xii.
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to think, reason, and discuss public matters publicly.”53 It is precisely this
ability with which the public school should be most concerned.
As Gutmann tells us, “Schools cannot possibly remain neutral in their
practices—they practice either tolerance or intolerance, racial discrimination
or nondiscrimination.”54 Therefore, in addition to teaching reading,
writing, and arithmetic, public schools should also be in the business of
teaching the civic and deliberative virtues such as “veracity, nonviolence,
practical judgment, civic integrity, and civic magnanimity.”55
Gutmann’s views of democratic education entail consequences for
student speech. She suggests a sliding scale for free speech in the public
schools that would increase as the students’ level of maturity, and
presumably their capacity for justice, increases.56 The very young have no
moral imagination and therefore it is necessary to teach them right from
wrong without entertaining any challenges from them. As they begin to
develop their own conceptions of morality, as individuals and social beings,
then the schools might allow them more leeway in expressing their own
reasoned judgments. It is always important to keep in mind, however,
that free speech is not an end in itself, and dissent for its own sake
should not be sanctioned by the schools. Gutmann also points out how
disagreement among students can be most useful to the hearers rather
than the speakers, but only if the speech itself is the product of public
reason.57
IV. A CRITICAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
“[A]cceptance of homosexuality is a political disagreement and
debate.”
—Judge Alex Kozinski, Ninth Circuit58
“[O]ne may doubt just how close debate by high-school students on
sexual preferences really is to the heart of the First Amendment.”
—Judge Richard A. Posner, Seventh Circuit59

53. Gutmann, Civic Minimalism, supra note 49, at 25.
54. Id. at 37.
55. Id. at 26.
56. Gutmann, supra note 40, at 523.
57. Id. at 529.
58. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1197 (9th Cir. 2006)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
59. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. #204, 523 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008).
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One of the most underappreciated features of the existing case law is the
political nature of the legal appellation of the word speech to various
utterances or acts, thereby bringing them within the protecting embrace of
the First Amendment. In particular, I am interested in showing how the
judicial decision to label attacks on gay identity as “political speech” or “the
expression of a point of view” is itself a political decision that puts the
juridical power of the court behind those who would deny gay adolescents
their socioexistential status. The claim here is not that this political act is
deliberate or conscious, but rather is the result of the heteronormative
outlook of the judges and the existing First Amendment precedent.
Judith Butler has performed a “rhetorical reading” of the cross-burning
case R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,60 which helps explain the political nature of
judicial decisions that deny the violence caused by hate speech.61 In
explaining how the Supreme Court’s decision to label a burning cross
placed in a black family’s front yard as the expression of a “viewpoint”
rather than an instance of “fighting words”—and therefore protected speech
rather than unprotected—Butler shows how the “court’s speech carries with
it its own violence.”62 The most useful features of Butler’s work do two
important things. First, she exposes the “contradictory set of rhetorical
strategies at work in the decision.”63 Second, Butler demonstrates how
“the very institution that is invested with the task of adjudicating the
problem of hate speech recirculates and redirects that hatred in and as its
own highly consequential speech, often by co-opting the very language
that it seeks to adjudicate.”64
The contradictory set of rhetorical strategies that Butler describes is
revealed through an examination of the distinct ways in which the Court
treats the victims of hate speech and their attackers. Frequently, we see
courts inverting the victim and harasser roles. That is, those who spout
hate speech are characterized as the victims of the First Amendment’s
enemies, whereas the hate speech’s actual victims are portrayed as
enablers of constitutional violations. Although Butler focuses on those
who express racist sentiments and those who are their victims, the same

60. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
61. Judith Butler, Burning Acts: Injurious Speech, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 199,
207 (1996).
62. Id. at 208.
63. Id.
64. Id.

805

analysis might be used to analyze courts’ treatment of antigay speech in
the school setting.
In the R.A.V. case, the Court characterized those who would silence the
cross burners because of their “reprehensible” act as themselves setting fire
to the First Amendment.65 As Butler observes, “The analogy suggests that
the ordinance is itself a kind of cross-burning . . . .”66 More importantly, she
concludes that the Court’s own use of the fire metaphor “affirms the
destructiveness of the cross-burning that the decision itself effectively
denies, the destructiveness of the act that it has just elevated to the status of
protected verbal currency within the marketplace of ideas.”67 We will see
this contradictory rhetorical approach in the antigay school speech cases as
well. In those cases, either the gay students or the schools will claim that
those students who utter antigay or antiidentity speech must be silenced in
order for gay students to obtain equal educational opportunities. By
contrast, some courts have held that it is the harassing and bullying students
who are the real victims because they would be unable to say what is on
their minds. Butler helps us see that if this is the real harm with which
courts are concerned—the inability to express oneself—then it is the gay
students who are harmed far more by the atmosphere created by the
antiidentity speech.
In exploring how the Court invests hate speech with content, thus turning
it into political speech, Butler explains, “[W]hat is needed is not a better
understanding of speech acts or the injurious power of speech, but the
strategic and contradictory uses to which the court puts these various
formulations.”68 Butler shows the strategy and contradiction at work by
contrasting R.A.V. with the obscenity cases, pointing out how the Court in
the latter cases exempts sex-infused speech from First Amendment
protection using “the very [same] rationale proposed by some arguments in
favor of hate crime legislation.”69 In allowing that a work might lack
serious “literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”70—the standard for
obscenity—the Court must be saying that the work is “immediately and

65. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396 (“St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent
such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire.”).
66. Butler, supra note 61, at 208.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 216.
69. Id.; see also KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, DEGRADATION: WHAT THE HISTORY OF
OBSCENITY TELLS US ABOUT HATE SPEECH 194 (2011) (arguing that hate speech should
be exempted from First Amendment protection just like obscenity because both are
sources of “a degraded view of humanity”). Saunders’s work is especially valuable to
the argument of this Article as he points out that we have even more reason to be hesitant
to apply the First Amendment to children in the contexts of obscenity and hate speech.
Id. at 167–92.
70. Butler, supra note 61, at 217 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
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unobjectionably injurious” and thus “excluded from the thematic and the
valuable and, hence, from protected status.”71 This willingness to grant that
such words or images might be sufficiently injurious “must be read against
the unwillingness to countenance the injuriousness of the burning cross in
front of the black family’s house.”72 Further, “whereas the ‘injury’ claimed
by the viewer of graphic sexual representation is honored . . . , the injury
sustained by the black family with the burning cross out front . . . proves too
ambiguous, too hypothetical to abrogate the ostensible sanctity of the First
Amendment.”73
This second part of Butler’s analysis is relevant to antigay identity
school speech on two different fronts. At one level, gay students are in
the same position as the black family in R.A.V. in the sense that the
courts refuse to classify their experiences as injuries, instead finding any
harm from the antiidentity speech too ambiguous and too hypothetical.
At another level, however, we can detect in many court opinions a fear
of homosexuality—likely a fear of sexuality more generally—the same sort
of fear that allows courts to easily find obscenity to be unexpressive. In
analyzing the Court’s conclusions in R.A.V., Butler finds the Court “allying
itself with those who would seek protection from a spectre wrought from
their own fantasy. Thus the Court protects the burning cross as free speech,
figuring those it injures as the site of the true threat . . . .”74 The same might
be said of courts’ fears of mixing homosexuality and adolescence. By
allying themselves with antigay identity speech, courts are labeling gay
youths as the real source of threat, and if not the youths themselves, then at
the very least the abstraction of homosexuality. But as explained elsewhere,
to a gay adolescent—or any gay individual—the separation of sexual
identity and human identity is nonsensical and can only be understood as a
condemnation of his or her self-identity.75
If Judith Butler helps us see how the attribution of the label “political
speech” to attacks on adolescent gay identity is itself a political act, then

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 218. The “true threat” Butler has in mind here is African-Americans,
whose potential to riot and commit other criminal acts is the true threat to law and order
and thus, the Justices themselves. See id.
75. Butler, supra note 44, at 61. Butler talks about categories with “constitutive
power,” like race and gender, such that “we cannot have a conception of a person without first
determining that person’s sex, for instance.” Id. Sexual orientation is such a constitutive
category such that “the elimination of the category eliminates the person as well.” Id.
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Cheshire Calhoun furthers our understanding of why this political move
so frequently goes unnoticed and unremarked upon even by traditional gay
allies.76 As Calhoun explains, there is a double standard for heterosexual as
opposed to homosexual identity, which “is based on the assumption that
heterosexuality is and ought to be constitutive of what it means to be a
public actor and citizen.”77 In other words, our entire First Amendment
doctrine is premised on the notion of a heterosexual speaker. This insight
helps to clarify why gay students are so frequently met with challenges from
their fellow heterosexual students, faculty, administrators, and not least of
all, judges. These challenges assert that it is they—the gay students—who
are being political in expressing their gay identity. From this premise it then
follows, under traditional First Amendment doctrine, that remarks attacking
students’ gay identity are merely political expressions, usually reactions to
the gay students’ initiation of a political debate.78 By better understanding
the double standard of sexuality self-representation, we can expose the
heteronormative bias of the seemingly neutral First Amendment.
When Calhoun tells us, “Heterosexuals move about in the public sphere
as heterosexuals, and that identity is by no means a private matter,”79 she
forces us to recognize several important features of public life. First,
contrary to many opinions that will come under analysis,80 sexuality is a
regular feature of public discourse, even though it might not be recognized
as such. Second, it is a very specific sexuality, namely heterosexuality,
which is so ubiquitous in society that it largely goes unnoticed. Finally,
76. I have in mind here the ACLU in particular. There is no doubt that the ACLU
champions gay rights to a certain extent. See LGBT Rights, ACLU, http://www.aclu.
org/lgbt-rights (last visited Sept. 23, 2012). However, in many of the speech cases, the
ACLU thinks that the abstraction of “free speech” trumps the abstraction of “adolescent
identity protection.” It is the goal of this Part to explain how the ACLU might reconsider by
understanding that gay students are effectively silenced by antiidentity speech, and thus,
the abstraction of free speech might nevertheless be used in reversing course.
77. Cheshire Calhoun, Sexuality Injustice, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 241, 253 (1995).
78. See, e.g., Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. #204, 523 F.3d 668, 677–78 (7th Cir.
2008) (Rovner, J., concurring). The concurring judge characterized an attack on gay identity
as follows: “They have initiated a dialogue in which Nuxoll wishes to participate.” Id. at 678.
In this instance, “they” were the school’s gay-straight alliance and the “dialogue” was the Day
of Silence, better characterized as a plea to realize the pain caused to gay students by the
social ignorance of their existence. Id. at 670 (majority opinion). Nuxoll’s “participation”
was a t-shirt with the slogan “Be Happy, Not Gay,” hardly an argument in a nonexistent
debate. Id.
79. Calhoun, supra note 77, at 253.
80. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 2d 869, 871 (N.D.
Ohio 2003) (discussing principal who told a harassed student that “if he shut his mouth
about gay rights, he would stop getting into so many fights” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Henkle v. Gregory, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1070 (D. Nev. 2001) (discussing
how rather than taking steps to end harassment or discipline the harasser, an English teacher
told a gay student “that his sexuality was a private matter that should be kept to himself”).
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public identifications as heterosexual do not routinely qualify as revelations
of one’s private life and thus assume no attendant risk of politicizing one’s
identity. Thus a heterosexual is free to move about in the public sphere—as
a citizen, parent, schoolteacher, or First Amendment speaker—and never
have his heterosexual self-representation—a picture of his wife or girlfriend,
or his casual mention of a date—called into question as the assertion of a
political point of view.
In explaining why the statement, “I am a woman,” would not ordinarily
be considered a political expression or the expression of a private viewpoint,
Calhoun tells us that it is because gender is “constitutive of being a
speaker.”81 Calhoun further explains:
[G]ender is such a fundamental social category that it is the first thing people want
to know about the persons with whom they interact. . . . Furthermore, in our social
world the psychological process of becoming gendered is part of the process of
becoming a self, a subject, an “I”. In short, speakers enter into the world . . . as
gendered subjects.82

All this leads up to Calhoun’s fundamental point about how identity
speech differs from political expression: “[G]ender is better viewed as a
feature of being a speaker rather than simply something one might wish to
express to others.”83 This same analysis should apply to sexuality.
“For better or worse, we have inherited a view of sexuality as something
that, like gender, pervades the entire personality and orients persons
in the social world.”84 First Amendment actors enter the world as
sexualized subjects—adults as presumptive heterosexuals, children
as protoheterosexuals.85 Unlike gender, or in many instances race, an
individual speaker’s sexuality is presumed, and self-representations that
reinforce that presumption are the unremarkable norm.86 However, when in
the course of public dialogue a nonnormative sexual self-representation is
made, such as the assertion of gay identity, that speaker’s social existence is
challenged as a contestable point of view.87 This occurrence is best viewed
as a challenge to the ability of a gay-identified subject to speak at all.88 As
Calhoun concludes, although the First Amendment protects what may be
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Calhoun, supra note 77, at 259.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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said, “[i]t does not protect speakers, guaranteeing that some sorts of
speakers may do the saying.”89
The upshot of the predicament in which gay and lesbian speakers find
themselves is that they are entitled only to “politicized publicity and only to
the public sphere of political debate.”90 “[B]y entering the public sphere
only . . . as debatable speakers,”91 gays and lesbians find that the First
Amendment’s formal equality results in de facto inequality because in a
heteronormative social world, where the presumption is a heterosexual
speaker, it is only homosexuals who face the burden of reversing the
heterosexual presumption. If First Amendment doctrine views every
attempt to reverse that social presumption as political speech, then it is
favoring those who never find themselves forced into such an explicit selfidentification burden. Heterosexuals will be able to live their private lives in
a “public nonpoliticized space,” while gays and lesbians will find no
protection for themselves as First Amendment rights-bearing speakers.92
In a series of articles, Nan Hunter has very thoroughly examined the
problems inherent in identity speech. In exploring “the relationship
between expression and equality,”93 Hunter has identified the point in time
when gayness became a political point of view, namely in 1979, when the
California Supreme Court held that coming-out speech was an “important
aspect of the struggle for equal rights,” and thus “explicitly political.”94
Hunter concludes that the political environment surrounding the court’s
holding in Gay Law Students “marked the emergence of homosexuality as
an openly political claim and as a viewpoint,” which, in turn, led the court to
consider “gay speech as the advocacy of ideas.”95 Although this was a
victory for gay equality at the time, courts have had difficulty reconciling
political equality with identity speech in subsequent cases.96
In 1993, Hunter concluded her first article on the relationship between
speech and equality by noting that “the law needs a much more clearly
articulated conceptualization of the intrinsic role of expression at the very
heart of equality.”97 Because speech itself is “a major factor in constructing
identity[, i]dentity cannot exist without it.”98 In other words, Hunter was set
89. Id.
90. Id. at 260–61.
91. Id. at 261.
92. See id. at 261–62.
93. Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695, 1695 (1993).
94. Id. at 1705 (quoting Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d
592, 610 (Cal. 1979)).
95. Id. at 1704–05.
96. See id. at 1717–18 (criticizing legal doctrine for being unable to deal with
identity claims).
97. Id. at 1718.
98. Id.
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to recognize the importance of language in the social construction of
something as fundamental as identity. Thus it is no surprise that in her next
major article in 2000, Hunter relied explicitly on Judith Butler’s notion of
performativity in explaining that “universal rights like free speech too often
translate[] into exclusionary blind spots and a failure to see that not
everyone benefits equally from humanistic principles.”99
The main point of Hunter’s second article was to explain why “expressive
identity” was “not a conventional political viewpoint.”100 Instead of seeing
gay self-expression as run-of-the-mill First Amendment speech, Hunter
explained why the expression of a gay viewpoint was better seen as the
expression of a gay “point of view(ing).”101 Putting identity speech
squarely in its social context, Hunter showed how gay identity was itself
the product of the sociopolitical subordination faced by homosexuals as a
minoritized community.102 Thus, any utterance that could be interpreted as
a gay viewpoint was better seen as the expression of an unequal social
situation. Recalling Calhoun, the only reason an individual’s expression of
sexual identity gains notice as political speech is because it directly
challenges the heteronormative assumptions thrust upon every speaker.103
Hunter teaches us that every instance of gay self-expression is really an
assertion of identity filtered through the lens of social hierarchy—a
reminder of the inequality that the heteronormative social order would
like us to forget.104
Hunter maintains that the First Amendment can be a tool for gay equality
as long as true dissent—the expression of a minority sexual identity—is
protected.105 However, in order for free speech law to promote “inclusion
and genuine antiorthodoxy,” the First Amendment must not be called in
to silence gay identity speech.106
To know identity speech when we see it requires a robust definition of
identity that can be called upon both to protect gay identity from state
interference and to allow states to protect it from private, third-party

99. Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000); see also JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM
AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 134–41 (1990).
100. Hunter, supra note 99, at 7.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 84–89.
104. Hunter, supra note 99, at 5.
105. Id. at 54–55.
106. Id. at 26.
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interference against competing First Amendment claims. Hunter describes
identity as more than a label, but less than a prescriptive set of political
viewpoints.
Why is it that fifteen years later the public school setting has become
the ideal site to see the theories of Butler and Calhoun work themselves
out with their many ramifications? The answer has to do, I think, with the
confluence of sexuality and childhood and the growing acknowledgement
of homosexuality as a normative social identity within and among youth
culture. When the existence of gay adolescents is itself doubtful in many
people’s minds, yet the presence of homosexuality is on the rise in popular
culture, then it is easier to ignore gay youths as First Amendment speakers
and it is easier to see gayness as the real threat to adolescents rather than
any injuries that might flow from antigay hate speech.
V. HETERONORMATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CASE LAW
Analytically, courts have considered homosexuality in three major
lights. First, and most commonly, judges have viewed any mention of
gayness as a political issue, triggering ordinary First Amendment speech
analysis. Second, many of those offended by gay students have attempted
to argue that their insults and hurtful comments are really just an exercise of
their religious liberty. Finally, conservative schools and parents have
tried to claim that any mention of gayness is necessarily prurient in
nature and thus ought to be censored or silenced as such.
Too often, courts have entertained the notion that any mention of the
existence of homosexuality in either a nonjudgmental or an affirming
light requires that antigay voices be given equal airtime. Occasionally,
schools should not be surprised when dissenting voices clamor in response
to school-initiated programs, like a progay forum or a new gay-positive
curriculum. These one-time events or sudden changes might seem to
demand a response, especially if they were the result of some secretive
or nondeliberative process. On other occasions, it is the students themselves
who initiate the progay messages, and it is their fellow students who
claim for themselves nothing more than the opportunity to respond with
an opposite message. In these scenarios, it is worth considering precisely
what message antigay students think they are sending and how they
intend that it be received. Finally, there are school antiharassment
policies, ostensibly designed to create and maintain a harmonious
learning environment. It is these policies that embody the sort of
democratic socialization expected of public schools. Yet, schools have
found themselves defending their policies against claims that they
unconstitutionally stifle antigay “speech.” It is with these most unlikely
claims that we begin.
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As discussed above, the primary purpose of public education is the
socialization of our nation’s youth in order to prepare them for life in a
society committed to predetermined values concerning the treatment of
fellow citizens. Chief among those social values is the idea that one
individual should not harass another, thereby causing another unjustifiable
physical or emotional pain. When school districts have attempted to
codify such commonsense values in their official school policies or
codes of conduct, some have been sued for alleged infringement of
students’ First Amendment rights. The usual response is that although
antiharassment may well be a shared American value, so is the freedom to
openly disagree and criticize others’ views of what constitutes a good life.
Perhaps even more central to American identity than a harassment-free
social life is a citizenry filled with individuals unwilling to accept orthodoxy
of whatever kind, including a government-sanctioned prescription not to
harass others. Indeed, if one takes an overly rigid, liberal individualist view
of the matter, then this tension might pose a real problem. However, a
pragmatist sees no inherent conflict between allowing all students to grow
and develop, intellectually and socially, in a harassment-free school
environment and merely delaying the ability of some students to utter
disparaging remarks until their target students are no longer in a captive
setting. All this delay means is that students do not get to harass others
until they are off campus. It also teaches students that certain settings
are not socially appropriate venues for spouting whatever comes to mind,
even if there is nothing legally wrong with expressing oneself to the
fullest.
Consider the following antiharassment policy adopted by a Pennsylvania
school district in 1999, which reads in relevant part: “Harassment means
verbal or physical conduct based on one’s actual or perceived . . . sexual
orientation, . . . and which has the purpose or effect of substantially
interfering with a student’s educational performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive environment.”107 The policy further
indicated that harassment could include “any unwelcome verbal, written or
physical conduct which offends, denigrates, or belittles an individual
because of [one’s sexual orientation].”108 From a theoretical perspective,
the school was clearly attempting to socialize the youngsters in its care to
believe that saying or doing something to a fellow student based upon that

107.
108.

Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 218 app. (3d Cir. 2001).
Id.
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student’s sexual orientation that caused him or her to be intimidated or
otherwise feel bad about himself or herself because of the student’s
sexuality was not a socially acceptable mode of behavior. However, once
put in the hands of the judges, that simple policy goal was turned on its
head, and instead a court found that it was the potential harassers who were
the real victims.
In Saxe, students and their guardians sued the Pennsylvania school district
that adopted the above policy.109 The plaintiffs claimed that as Christians,
they had a right and duty to “speak out about the sinful nature and harmful
effects of homosexuality.”110 Then-Judge Alito agreed with the plaintiffs
that the school’s policy “strikes at the heart of moral and political
discourse—the lifeblood of constitutional self government (and democratic
education) and the core concern of the First Amendment.”111 One might
have thought that a Christian student telling a gay student he is going to hell
and distributing pamphlets that say the same constituted the real interference
with “political discourse” and “democratic education,”112 but not according
to Judge Alito and the Third Circuit. For Judge Alito, the main problem
with the antiharassment policy in Saxe was that it was overly broad because
it apparently extended to cases in which a student’s potentially harassing
“speech” did not actually amount to harassment.113 “[S]peech that merely
intends to [harass]” but fails to succeed was troublesomely covered by the
policy.114
The most analytically unsound portion of Judge Alito’s Saxe opinion
concerns his discussion of why the case should be controlled by Texas v.
Johnson,115 the flag-burning case. Judge Alito was particularly offended
that the school would dare prohibit speech directed at criticizing another
student’s “values.”116 Because homosexuality was the only specific feature
listed in the complaint, Judge Alito must have assumed that it was
connected to or subsumed under the heading of “values.” He then quotes
Johnson to the effect that free speech “may indeed best serve its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.”117 Only one with a
perverse understanding of socialization in the service of democratic
education would assert that conditions of unrest in a high school filled with
109. Id. at 202.
110. Id. at 203.
111. Id. at 210.
112. See generally GUTMANN, supra note 49.
113. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 210 (“The Policy extends to speech that merely has the
‘purpose’ of harassing another.”).
114. Id. at 216.
115. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
116. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id. (quoting Johnson, 491 U.S. at 408–09) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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angry students were beneficial to either the students or society at large. This
is especially the case when the unrest or anger is caused by discussion of
sexuality—a personal feature better characterized as belonging to one’s
identity than one’s set of values.
One might question just how central a free-for-all discussion of values is
in the school setting. This is because the pragmatic view of education put
forward above recognizes that it is the schools themselves that are charged
with inculcating a good deal of their students’ values.118 As other courts
have recognized, “mutual respect,” a value “manifest in the First
Amendment[],” means that there is no constitutional “right” to express
one’s belief system through disrespectful and harassing actions.119 If
schools cannot teach mutual respect without running afoul of the First
Amendment, then the courts have sacrificed civil society upon the alter of
liberalism. Although this is an important point to which I will return below,
it is equally important to see that this tension can be avoided if courts stop
characterizing sexuality as political.
In a more recent case, another “Christian who believe[d] that
homosexuality is a sin” and who “further believe[d] that part of his
responsibility as a Christian [was] to tell others when their conduct [did] not
comport with his understanding of Christian morality” sued his school
district over its antiharassment policy.120 The policy prohibited “behavior
based on . . . actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity . . .
that is sufficiently severe, pervasive, or objectively offensive that it
adversely affects a student’s education or creates a hostile or abusive
educational environment.” Moreover, harassment included “the use of
language, conduct, or symbols in such manner as to be commonly
understood to convey hatred, contempt, or prejudice or to have the effect

118. The Supreme Court itself, before Justice Alito arrived, recognized that the
“fundamental values” taught to students “must also take into account consideration of the
sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students.”
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986). The Court commented
even further:
Indeed, the “fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system” disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly
threatening to others. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from
insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to
sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly the “work of the schools.”
Id. at 683 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
119. Parker v. Hurley, 474 F. Supp. 2d 261, 264 (D. Mass. 2007), aff’d, 514 F.3d 87
(1st Cir. 2008).
120. Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 521 F.3d 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2008).
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of insulting or stigmatizing an individual.”121 The policy, coupled with a
training video shown to students, made some parents fear that their children
would be “discourage[d]” from “speaking about their religious beliefs
regarding homosexuality.”122 The Sixth Circuit rejected the challenge to the
policy on standing grounds,123 but only after the panel reversed itself on
rehearing, causing the dissenting judge—who was previously in the
majority—to express her consternation that “the district judge sitting by
designation” had changed his mind.124
Writing in dissent, Judge Karen Nelson Moore understood controlling
precedent to provide “no support for any restriction of speech that can
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social
issue.”125 She worried that the antiharassment language would prevent
students from pointing out “areas in which they disagree with other
students.”126 Moore never explains how, exactly, one would go about
“disagreeing” with another person’s sexuality. Would it make any sense
to Moore if someone wanted to “disagree” with another student’s race?
Interestingly enough, just four months after the Sixth Circuit decided
Morrison, it decided a case involving a student’s First Amendment
challenge to a school dress code that prohibited him from wearing the
Confederate flag on his t-shirt.127 Judge Moore sided with the school
district in the latter case.128
Even though Judge Moore wrote the opinion upholding the student
dress code in Barr v. Lafon, she did so on the basis of the proven
disruption caused by the display of the Confederate flag in a school with
high racial tensions.129 The dress code prohibited clothing that “causes
disruption to the educational process.”130 Judge Moore satisfied herself that
no First Amendment rights were violated because “[b]oth proponents of
racial tolerance and proponents of racial hatred are forbidden to display the
Confederate flag.”131 The whole opinion reads as though the Constitution
prohibits schools from socializing its students to believe that “racial hatred”
is un-American. This is an unfortunate opinion on at least two levels. First,
121. Id. at 605–06.
122. Id. at 606.
123. Id. at 605. Apparently the school district had changed its policy to something
less objectionable and the challenged policy was no longer in effect and thus no longer
preventing the plaintiff from speaking. Id.
124. Id. at 611 (Moore, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 624 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 422 (2007) (Alito, J.,
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id.
127. Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2008).
128. Id. at 575.
129. Id. at 577.
130. Id. at 556 (emphasis omitted).
131. Id. at 572.
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it threatens to render meaningful political debate meaningless by
undervaluing it with such an undifferentiated notion of speech. Second, and
most relevant to the school setting, the reasoning treats social truths as
though they were an unimportant part of the educational mission of public
schools.
Judge Moore would probably not see a First Amendment problem with a
school sanctioning a student who wanted to “disagree” with the proposition
“2+2=4.”132 Some would call that a mathematical or scientific truth, but it
is no less a social truth because some assign to it another ontological
status.133 One need only imagine the social disutility of turning out a large
number of students who thought that proposition was up for debate. We, as
a society, do not insist that students respect the “truth” of the proposition
because it is “natural” or “scientific.” Rather we insist upon accepting it
unquestioningly because every monetary transaction, indeed, nearly every
social interaction, depends upon it. Society might be as insistent upon
instilling, unquestioningly, the social truths of mutual respect and tolerance.
If we took those values as seriously as we take the “+” operator, then we
would treat those who wanted to preach “racial hatred” the same as those
who wanted to preach “+ is the same as –”: as people who had failed the
socialization process of elementary school. The problem, of course, is that
there is more social unanimity as to what “+” means than there is about
what “tolerance” means.
The increasing activism of gay students and their allies on school
campuses has led to a backlash from antigay students claiming for
themselves the right to espouse messages expressing their dissatisfaction
with their fellow students’ outspokenness. One of the more organized

132. It is clear that there remains disagreement on the Supreme Court about the
constitutional worth of false speech. At oral argument in United States v. Alvarez,
Justice Kennedy “[could not] find in our cases” support for the proposition that “there’s
no value to falsity.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.
Ct. 2537 (2012) (No. 11-210). By contrast, Justice Scalia expressed the view “that there
is no First Amendment value in falsehood.” Id. at 15. The Court was unable to resolve
this disagreement with a coherent theory, instead opting for a plurality opinion that
applied strict scrutiny, Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543, a concurring opinion that applied
intermediate scrutiny, id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring), and a dissenting opinion that
wrote, “false statements of fact merit no First Amendment protection in their own right,”
id. at 2562 (Alito, J., dissenting).
133. The pragmatism I spout, which is that of the late Richard Rorty, does not care
about the ontological status of anything. Hence, scientific truths, mathematical truths,
and social truths are all on equal footing; they are true to the extent they are useful. See
generally RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982).
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activities has been the national Day of Silence led by the Gay, Lesbian,
and Straight Education Network (GLSEN), a gay civil rights group that
focuses on the rights of gay youths in schools.134 GLSEN officially
sponsors campus-based gay-straight alliances (GSAs) at high schools across
the nation.135 On a single day each year, campus GSAs lead the Day of
Silence in which they urge all students not to speak throughout the day in
recognition of the metaphorical silence gay students face every day of the
year.136 In anticipation of the Day of Silence, the more organized GSAs
design t-shirts that reflect a message consistent with the day’s theme and
encourage all student supporters to wear them on the given day.137 Antigay
students, especially those who are religiously motivated, have attempted to
counter the Day of Silence with the so-called Day of Truth, organized
nationally by Focus on the Family.138 Like their gay counterparts,
the religious students also wear t-shirts. It is these antigay shirts that have
sparked First Amendment lawsuits.
In the San Diego suburb of Poway, California, Tyler Chase Harper
attempted to counter his school’s Day of Silence by wearing a t-shirt the
very next day that read, in part, “Homosexuality is Shameful.”139 In a
similar act of Christian rebellion, Alexander Nuxoll of Naperville,
Illinois, wore a t-shirt to his high school reading, “Be Happy, Not Gay,”
on the Day of Truth.140 When school officials at both high schools
ordered Harper and Nuxoll to remove their t-shirts, both boys interpreted
the actions as violations of their First Amendment speech rights. A total
of six judges heard Harper’s and Nuxoll’s cases—one three-judge panel
in the Ninth Circuit and another in the Seventh Circuit. Out of the six
judges, only two judges—one from each panel—agreed with the boys
that their speech was, at its core, political speech of the sort the First
134. See About the Day of Silence, GLSEN, http://www.dayofsilence.org/resources
(last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
135. About Gay-Straight Alliances, GLSEN, http://www.glsen.org/cgi-bin/iowa/all/
library/record/2342.html?state=what (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
136. GLSEN, supra note 134.
137. See, e.g., Day of Silence: Testimonials, GLSEN, http://www.dayofsilence.org/
content/gi_testimonials.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
138. See Day of Dialogue, FOCUS ON THE FAMILY, http://www.dayoftruth.org (last
visited Sept. 23, 2012). This website will now take you to http://www.dayofdialogue.org,
as Focus on the Family has apparently changed the name of the event beginning in 2011.
I do not think it is a coincidence that this name change coincides with Judge Ilana
Rovner’s use of the word dialogue to describe Alexander Nuxoll’s attack on a fellow gay
student while participating in the Day of Truth. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. #204,
523 F.3d 668, 678 (7th Cir. 2008) (Rovner, J., concurring). See also supra note 78,
where I discuss Rovner’s concurrence as the sort of rhetoric that allows homosexuals to
exist only as political actors, whose social worth is a matter of public dialogue.
139. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006),
vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
140. Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 670.
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Amendment was designed to protect. However, Shannon Gilreath has
recently argued that the t-shirt messages were nothing of the sort; they
were pure “anti-identity” speech—an insidious type of “speech” that denies
its victims existential status.141 However, before exploring the aspects of
identity and its existential concerns, we must first attempt to understand
the supposed equation between Harper’s and Nuxoll’s messages and
political speech.
Judge Alex Kozinski laid blame for the Harper case squarely at the feet
of the high school. The Day of Silence, he noted, was “a political activity
that was sponsored or at the very least tolerated by school authorities. . . .
So long as the subject is kept out of the school environment,” Judge
Kozinski explained, “these differences of opinion need not clash.”142 If that
were not clear enough, Judge Kozinski further wrote that “acceptance of
homosexuality is a political disagreement and debate” and by permitting
the GSA to conduct the Day of Silence on campus combined with silencing
Harper, the school was “promoting one political or religious viewpoint over
another.”143 Judge Kozinski’s words fundamentally lack meaning to gay
people because, as Part III illustrated above, for better or worse, sexuality,
especially for male adolescents, has constitutive social power such that
debating the “acceptance of homosexuality” is tantamount to putting up for
debate the social worth of the student himself. This problem has been made
painfully clear with a recent spate of adolescent male suicides, where the
boys have literally ended their existence because they saw acceptance of
their humanity on the losing side of a “political” debate.144

141. See Shannon Gilreath, “Tell Your Faggot Friend He Owes Me $500 for My Broken
Hand”: Thoughts on a Substantive Equality Theory of Free Speech, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
557, 558–59 (2009). Gilreath expands on his theory in SHANNON GILREATH, THE END OF
STRAIGHT SUPREMACY: REALIZING GAY LIBERATION (2011).
142. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1196 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1197 (quoting Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780, 803
(E.D. Mich. 2003)).
144. In an important new work, Jeremy Waldron argues, “[H]ate speech is both a
calculated affront to the dignity of vulnerable members of society and a calculated assault
on the public good of inclusiveness.” JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 5–
6 (2012). Although he does not feature the LGBT community in any prominent way in
the book, his theory could certainly be extended to further the arguments of this Article.
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VI. CONCLUSION: CREATING THE LINK BETWEEN REAL
HARM AND REAL STUDENTS
“[T]he proof is thin that the problems of gay students at school are
linked to t-shirts expressing messages on issues of public
concern.”
—Michael Kent Curtis, Law Professor145
“Though the report calls ‘be happy, not gay’ particularly insidious,
it does not indicate what effects it would be likely to have on
homosexual students. . . . Russell’s is as thin an expert-witness
report as we’ve seen.”
—Judge Richard A. Posner146
“The organizing effect[] of ‘fag’ rhetoric on the gay consciousness
of my informants was profound. This use of language, this naming
within the patriarchy, sets up an internal dialogue within
individuals. . . .
....
Over and over again informants talked about the process
beginning with gossip and verbal abuse as creating an internal
dialogue organizing their behavior.”
—George W. Smith, Ethnographer147
The previous Parts provide us with the necessary critical tools to
understand why it is only from a heteronormative vantage point that
Michael Kent Curtis’s statement has logical appeal. Students’ attempts to
undermine their fellow gay students’ social existence is only a “matter of
public concern” if the constitutive power of sexual orientation to define
the individual is up for debate. However, Curtis’s statement, despite
failing to demonstrate any empathy for gay students, does highlight the
central legal hurdle that many courts have successfully erected in the
name of free speech protection. The doctrinal problem for gay students
has been in satisfying the Tinker test, proving that the antigay speech at
issue causes substantial disruption to the learning environment.148 Thus,
145. Michael Kent Curtis, Be Careful What You Wish For: Gays, Dueling High
School T-Shirts, and the Perils of Suppression, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 431, 487
(2009) (labeling attacks on gay identity as a matter “of public concern”).
146. Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 881 (7th Cir. 2011).
147. George W. Smith, The Ideology of “Fag”: The School Experience of Gay Students,
39 SOC. Q. 309, 322–24 (1998).
148. See Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 879–81 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)).
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even empathetic jurists like Judge Posner have expressed frustration
with the lack of evidence litigants have been able to produce to satisfy
the “material disruption” test.149 Recently, the Ninth Circuit breathed
life into Tinker’s alternate test by refocusing its attention on whether the
antigay messages would interfere with the rights of other students.150
However, under either Tinker test—material disruption or interference
with the right of others—it seems that there is promising social science
research—yet to be fully utilized in these sorts of cases—that would go a
long way in creating the causal link between antiidentity speech and
potential physical and mental harm to gay students.
In the most recent t-shirt case, Zamecnik, the Seventh Circuit, speaking
through Judge Posner, held that a public high school unjustifiably violated a
student’s First Amendment rights by banning a t-shirt that read, “Be Happy,
Not Gay.”151 Because the phrase did not amount to an instance of fighting
words, the court felt that Tinker provided the appropriate standard: “To
justify prohibiting [the t-shirt,] the school would have to present ‘facts
which might reasonably lead school officials to forecast substantial
disruption.’”152 Judge Posner explained that such facts might include “a
decline in students’ test scores, an upsurge in truancy, or other symptoms of
a sick school.”153 When the same panel of the Seventh Circuit had first
heard an appeal at the preliminary injunction stage, Judge Posner then
labeled the slogan “Be Happy, Not Gay” as “only tepidly negative,” and
thus the burden was squarely on the school to mount some evidence that
“substantial disruption” would result.154 The school’s expert witness,
Stephen T. Russell, a sociologist and a family and consumer sciences
professor at the University of Arizona, failed to clear the Tinker hurdle.155
Despite the guidance the court gave to the school in Nuxoll—the
preliminary injunction appeal—the subsequent presentation of evidence was
a complete failure, resulting in summary judgment for the antigay student,
Heidi Zamecnik. The three types of evidence offered concerned “incidents
of harassment of homosexual students; incidents of harassment of plaintiff

149. Id.
150. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)
(citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
151. Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 875, 882.
152. Id. at 876 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514).
153. Id.
154. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir. 2008).
155. Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 880–81; see also supra text accompanying note 146.
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Zamecnik; and the report of an expert [Russell].”156 It is clear that had any
one of those three types of evidence panned out, summary judgment against
the school would have been inappropriate. To understand why the school
lost, we need to see that the real problem was with the evidence, not the law
as interpreted by the Seventh Circuit.
One might think that evidence of the harassment of gay students at a
major suburban high school with an enrollment of “thousands of
students”157 would not be difficult to come by, unless the school engaged
in no systematic effort to combat gay harassment in the first place.
Therefore, it seems the next step is clear: design laws that insist upon
clear record keeping of reported harassment. To the extent the school
environment is not conducive to student reporting, school staff, including
teachers, administrators, and all other adults who interact with and observe
students must have similar harassment reporting requirements.
However, there is also a growing body of social science evidence—
sociological, psychological, ethnographic, and medical—that supports the
findings that prevalent school harassment, including “mere” verbal
harassment, has material negative effects on gay and lesbian students.158
This material is ripe for examination by legal scholars, who can best explain
to civil rights attorneys how they might make use of it in the next student
harassment case. These studies would also help respond to Judge Posner’s
calls for evidence—any evidence—that demonstrates that offensive t-shirts
are much more than just that.

156. Zamecnik, 636 F.3d at 879.
157. Id.
158. The most recent studies of antiidentity bullying among adolescents come out of
the United Kingdom. See generally MARK MCCORMACK, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF
HOMOPHOBIA: HOW TEENAGE BOYS ARE REDEFINING MASCULINITY AND HETEROSEXUALITY
(2012); IAN RIVERS, HOMOPHOBIC BULLYING: RESEARCH AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
(2011).
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